Paul from Paris

1. Did Sarkozy lose the election, or for the incumbent was this race unwinnable? Did Sarkozy and his handlers tragically misread or underestimate the strength and depth of anti-Sarkozy sentiment in the electorate?
2. Does Hollande hold a mandate for anything? Did his blandness and seeming lack of substance improve his performance as the anti-incumbent?
3. Which was the greatest disservice to Sarkozy’s campaign: morose economic conditions that would be a curse to any candidate; policy proposals that struck voters as unattractive (or even repulsive); or the candidate’s own personality (hyperactive, ever-changing)?
4. Sarkozy held off, for a long time, in declaring his candidacy for re-election. Would his campaign have been better served had he officially announced his intention to seek re-election the day (before? after?) Hollande was anointed as his challenger?
5. In 2007, Sarkozy ran as a candidate of change. This was no mean feat, as conservatives were in power, and Sarkozy held ministerial portfolios. In 2012, Sarkozy ran as an outsider (not as the incumbent, based on a record) seeking –paradoxically– to preserve (or conserve, but not to change) French institutions and lifestyle. Would Sarkozy have been better served by running, again in 2012, as the candidate for change?
6. In 2007, Sarkozy’s “travailler plus pour gagner plus” (work more to earn more, earn more by working more) echoed Blair’s call for an “opportunity society”: both championed for social mobility. By 2012, social mobility disappeared from Sarkozy’s objectives. Evocations of “travail” (work) rang hollow and divisive. Would the Sarkozy campaign have stood better chances had the incumbent positioned himself as an advocate for social mobility?
7. Sarkozy’s 2007 campaign slogan echoed an exhortation made long ago, under the reign of King Louis-Philippe, by statesman François Guizot: “Enrichissez-vous” (enrich yourselves). Both slogans shrugged off traditional unease with money and shone a favorable light on material prosperity. Unfavorable publicity surrounding Sarkozy –a celebratory dinner on the Champs-Elysées, a respite on a billionaire’s yacht, a noticeable penchant for aviator sunglasses and collectable watches– tempered arguments in favor of making money. Since the financial crisis, growth seems not to be even an option in Sarkozy’s mind. By 2012, any tax relief seemed off the table; Sarkozy instead pushed for a tax rearrangement that would cut some payroll taxes but boost VAT, paid by all and felt heavily by lower-income households. Would Sarkozy’s prospects have shown more promise had the candidate at least paid lip service to the goal of increasing household income and bettering material circumstances?
8. Until a year ago, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the socialist also-ran tapped by Sarkozy to head the IMF, seemed, largely on a widely shared assumption of economic competence, likely to win his party’s nomination and the 2012 presidential election. Once Strauss-Kahn ceased to be a political rival, why didn’t Sarkozy and his handlers build the incumbent’s campaign around economic themes, developed over several months?

French president Sarkozy announced a scheme to promote learning English. Sarkozy has trouble with his native tongue and has a limited command of English. His scheme revolves around preschoolers and computers. It won’t work: French students tread water in language classes for years, never progressing towards measurable competence; and French language teaching adores abstraction and hidebound rules.

Le Monde accompanied its report of the presidential scheme with testimony from its readers and bloggers. Their comments are eye-opening. Where and how do French people learn English? Not in the classroom, in class; but at home, while watching “South Park” or “Friends,” reading Harry Potter, or listening to popular music.

On languages, Sarkozy turns out to be more a follower than a leader. What is really happening, today, in French society is more impressive than politicians’ vague hopes for the future. The photo above was taken at a Relay newsstand in a Paris train station. The display window promotes four titles. Remarkably, the books are available in French translation, and also in English. A close look will reveal two lessons: the English-language books are physically smaller than the French translations; and the English-language books are significantly cheaper than the French translations.

Louis XIV by Hyacinthe Rigaud (1701)

Louis XIV never actually said, “L’Etat, c’est moi” (I’m the State), according to historians. But the saying fits with the image we have of the absolute monarch. The saying has staying power.

Some say that French president Sarkozy has a Napoleon complex. I beg to differ: doesn’t Sarkozy instead have a Louis XIV complex?

In today’s France, don’t all discussions turn, sooner or later, to politics? And, when they do, doesn’t Sarkozy quickly take center stage?

At this point in Sarkozy’s presidency, the catalog of projects is becoming long: save the planet, get the scum (la racaille) out of troubled neighborhoods, refound finance on a sound moral foundation, encourage business growth, earn more by working more, ….

But here’s the paradox: as much as Sarkozy would like to stake a claim on reclaiming safe streets, returning to secure jobs, and generally righting wrongs everywhere, his record on actual accomplishment is thin. The State isn’t up to Sarkozy’s oversized ambitions.

Isn’t this as it should be? Isn’t modest government or limited government –keenly aware of its limitations, whether by design or in practice– preferable to a state that thinks itself up to mastering any challenge?

For a few brief months in 2004, Nicolas Sarkozy served as French finance minister. His tenure was as unremarkable as it was brief. Its highlight was probably the 30 August visit, to Sarkozy and his spouse Cécila, by actor Tom Cruise, in Paris to promote “Collateral”, the Michael Mann picture in which he starred.

No one seems to have briefed Sarkozy on “Collateral”. It’s a movie about a hit man (the role played by Cruise), on an all-night murderous rampage through Los Angeles.

Likewise, no one seems to have briefed Sarkozy today on how public opinion is likely to react when the French president talks of increasing taxes.

Sarkozy has been talking a lot about taxes lately. He wants to “find” 100 billion euros in the next three years. He wants to close loopholes (which, in France, are adorably named “niches fiscales“). He wants to increase the duration of retirement contributions, pushing back the retirement age. (This led to a call to strike tomorrow.)

Public opinion got the message, loud and clear. Most French people –a recent poll pegged the percentage at over 70%– think taxes will increase. Most French people –the same poll points to an ever greater share, above 80%– would prefer that any new taxes target “the rich” or banks.

What ever happened to economic growth?

Early in presidency, Sarkozy was known for inciting people “to work more to earn more” (travailler plus pour gagner plus). His slogan may have been demagogic and ambiguous, but it pointed towards growth at the possibility of growth.

Today, the main economic issue seems to be confidence, particularly a perceived lack of confidence. Financial markets, investors, consumers: all are said to lack confidence. Sarkozy and his finance minister multiply trips and talks, but markets and opinion don’t budge: confidence is still lacking.

Memo to Sarkozy: Show some constancy. When you abandon one policy (work more to earn more), you erode credibility on any policy. Talk of increasing taxes –big jumps, all sorts of taxes– only reinforces impressions of disorder in public finances and dark days ahead for the economy generally.

(photo uncredited, probably by French finance ministry staff)

French president Sarkozy said, “There is no doubt that the eurozone is going through the most serious crisis since its creation….We can’t let the euro fall. The euro is Europe and Europe is peace”.

That’s one way to see things. Maybe it’s the majority view, but there are others:

• The European Union is not a federal system. The full faith and credit of all EU member states do not back the debts of a single member state.
• The euro is a common currency. It is not a NATO-like pact for mutual defense.
• Having a common currency does limit members’ ability to do certain things, like printing money to settle debts. Markets also discipline states who do this. Member states retain an arsenal of measures to finance expenditures, including deficits.
• EU members in the eurozone accept to follow agreed rules on deficits and public indebtedness. EU members have repeatedly excused members’ failure to meet these requirements.
• All eurozone members issue sovereign (state) debt. Each pays a distinct interest rate: some higher, some lower than others. All universally accept this to be normal.
• Greece today faces higher interest rates than other eurozone members. This is a consequence of Greek deficit spending and a high level of indebtedness, neither of which resulted from exceptional circumstances or unexpected crises. There is no economic argument why Greece should be entitled to access credit at interest rates available to Germany, or France, or Italy.