Paul from Paris

The title of John Bringardner's article in The New York Times certainly caught my eye. It's a meandering piece, and is does report on some news: US-based law firms are increasing the number and size of their overseas offices, and are hiring for these offices.

Having moved to France in 1992 to practice law, the article resonated with me. I'm committed to living and working abroad, and wouldn't want to discourage others from doing so. I appreciate that Bringardner probably was under deadline pressure and the "wow!" factor behind the headline. But the article, as I read it, is packed with wishful thinking. I'd regret if anyone was led astray by it.

Here are a few observations, for lawyers and for law firms, intended as a corrective:

1. There's a widely shared expectation that working abroad will somehow be easier (or, more subtly, better in a way that alleviates problems or that flattens barriers encountered at home). It's a fantasy shared by people regardless of origin: Americans, French, Chinese. It's a fallacy. Work is work, wherever it's done.
2. Americans are quick to put themselves on a pedestal and to misread what's special about their skill set. Americans somehow view the world as lacking legal talent or experience or even laws. There's an anecdote in the Times article — "helping to draft an anti-corruption law"– that illustrates this view. I'm sure that the lawyer quoted did contribute meaningfully to that effort, but many countries already have a pool of smart lawyers able to draft and enforce legislation. (This is not a uniquely American problem; Canadians or French people suffer from it too.)
3. The best new hire in some overseas office might not be a promising, top-performing lawyer from the United States. The skills actually in demand instead might be: preparedness to put in long hours; willingness to do tedious work without complaint; ability to answer the phone and to converse in English; and other social skills. These skills –that are necessary but mundane– may be what the overseas office most needs and what it finds comparatively hardest to recruit for locally.
4. As an empirical point, some firms open overseas offices simply to be closer to clients or otherwise to meet client needs. Along these lines, the legal work involved could be done equally well in New York or in Hong Kong (or in Houston or in Dubai). Where the work is done will depend on where the client and market are, and where teams can do the work most cost-effectively. Taken to the extreme, for the American lawyer the work will be exactly the same –not more glamorous, certainly not easier– wherever it's done. And for the American lawyer working conditions abroad may actually be harder: having to adjust to a lower level of secretarial support, coping with immigration and other bureaucratic formalities, not being able to have an after-work drink with friends, working for a smaller pool of clients or on only one kind of matter, being far from loved ones or influential colleagues.
5. The article suggests to me that US-based law firms open and close overseas offices all the time. This may be true, but doing so generates costs –financial, human, organizational– that go unmentioned. I'd be keenly interested in reading a follow-up article (or business school case study) that examines a law firm as it plans and implements the opening or development of an overseas office. These are tough decisions, never made lightly, but always worthy of study.

• bounded by a line connecting London, Paris, Milan, Munich, and Hamburg;
• covering 14% of the EU's territory;
• where one third of the EU's population lives. 

The figures are from the European Union, and are mentioned in an overview of European regional policy.

As with much center-periphery social science research, I'm not sure how much weight or importance to give to these statistics. Here are a couple of observations:

1. The pentagon described above is centered on the historic core of the European Union (France, Italy, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg), plus the south of England. In other words, subsequent enlargement has been to the periphery, not to the core.
2. Does regional policy really do anything? The answer would seem to be no, if we give weight to this center-periphery analysis. There's plenty of data supporting the positive contribution of regional development funds –in other words that support the proposition that regional policy really does something– which would seem to undercut the relevance of this center-periphery analysis.

I'd also recommend an excellent resource: the EU's Eurostat office has released its 2008 regional yearbook, available for free as a pdf, in English, French, and German.

In this spirit, I had my own Thomas Friedman moment recently. Only one anecdote, with only one or two (or four, depending on how you count) data points.

What I saw, here in France, was a meeting, in France, between co-workers in their 20s. Two were French, and two were Chinese.

The Chinese guy had an iPhone, with Chinese characters. He was completely at ease using it to look up a phone number in the French yellow pages, and he checked his messages politely, without disruption, during a break.

His Chinese colleague, a woman in her twenties, corrected my mispronunciation of her name. I had more or less invited her to do so, but I could sense how, for her, it was important to learn the others' names and for them to learn hers.

The energy and enthusiasm of the Chinese colleagues stood in contrast to that of their French co-workers. Everyone has a bad days (even a string of them!), but the French duo gave an unmistakable impression of fatigue (at 10:00 in the morning) and ennui (I really don't know what they would rather have been doing, but meeting with Chinese colleagues didn't engage them). The French guy checked his cell phone several during the meeting, on the lookout for messages.

The meeting took place among equals, all working on the same team. English was the working language. All seemed to have comparable technical merit in their field.

I'm a steadfast friend of France and have an overflowing reserve of goodwill towards younger Europeans. But in light of scenes like the one I've witnessed make me wonder: if it doesn't matter where work is done, what would motivate a global organization to site workers in France instead of in China? Granted, it often does matter where work is done. And one anecdote does not ground an economic policy. But I'm left with the conclusion that, when measured against comparable workers elsewhere, the French workers have catching up to do.

1. Cast of characters. Will you be the only person meeting with the minister? Or will others be competing for attention? Likewise, will the minister be alone, or will his cabinet accompany him? (Some ministers travel with "posses" in rap star style.) 
2. Brevity. In meetings, your point should fit on a note card. Limit any handout to one page.
3. Flexible schedule. Expect your meeting to begin late, or to be cut short. Plan accordingly.
4. Interruptions. Blackberry phones and text messaging are in fashion. (This is irritating but seems to go with the job.)
5. Follow-up. The meeting is going well if the minister tells you which member of his cabinet will follow up or serve as a future contact. As a rule, the minister will be political, whereas the cabinet member will be a technocrat.

The lame-duck Bush administration and fascination with President-elect Obama seems to have tempered the interest of mainstream Americans –or at least mainstream American media– for international regulatory issues.

From the conversations that I've been having with Europeans, I take away three big points:

1. There seems to be a transatlantic consensus on government stimulus measures. This is noncontroversial, notwithstanding the magnitude of programs under discussion or their likely aggravation of deficits.
2. European calls for regulation have, for the past month, been vocal, and Europeans believe that these calls were renewed last weekend.  I sense hesitancy and uncertainty on what the politically desired regulatory changes would involve. Sometimes, the objective seems to be harmonization. But other voices, especially from France and Germany, have been calling for entirely new regulatory schemes, covering for example hedge fund activities or executive compensation caps. It's hard to tell whether the latter proposals are for domestic political consumption or are seriously intended as proposals for international action. 
3. Restarting trade talks has become increasingly important. The difficulties in making progress have not diminished, but there seems to be a new sense of urgency to regain momentum and show a commitment to talking through very difficult sticking points. More is involved than simply warning against protectionism. My sense is that Americans are behind the curve on trade liberalization.